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Commercial Law-Materialmen's Liens in North Carolina: The
Problem of the Overeager Purchaser
The overeager owner and the overeager purchaser are figures well known
to construction lenders and title insurers.1 They are problem children of the
construction industry. The overeager owner jeopardizes the lender's efforts to
obtain a first priority lien by permitting construction to commence before the
lender can conduct the loan closing and record his mortgage or deed of trust.2
The overeager purchaser is even more daring; he orders the commencement of
construction before he ever acquires legal title to the property. 3 The question
whether the overeager purchaser's act may give rise to a materialman's statu-
tory lien, which would take precedence over a construction lender's deed of
trust filed simultaneously with the purchaser's deed, is a question not clearly
answered in the General Statutes or resolved by North Carolina's appellate
courts."
1. See Urban & Miles, Mechanics'Liensfor the Development of Real Property." Recent Devel-
opments in Perfection, Enforcement, and Priority, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 283, 329 (1976) and
examples cited infra notes 2-3. The terms "overeager owner" and "overeager purchaser" are not
found within the cited opinions, but are inventions employed throughout the text for purposes of
clarity and brevity.
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-8 (1976) (emphasis added) provides:
Any person who performs or furnishes labor.. . or. . . materials pursuant to a con-
tract, either express or implied, with the owner of real property for the making of an
improvement thereon shall, upon complying with the provisions of this Article, have a
lien on such real property to secure payment of all debts owing for labor done. . . or
material furnished pursuant to such contract.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-10 (1976) provides: "Liens granted by this Article shall relate to and take
effect from the time of the first furnishing of labor or materials at the site of the improvement by
the person claiming the lien." It is settled law that when an "owner" contracts with a materialman
and causes work to commence before the lender records his security instrument, the materialman
has the prior lien. E.g., Frank H. Conner Co. v. Spanish Inns Charlotte, Ltd., 294 N.C. 661, 242
S.E.2d 785 (1978); Sides v. Tidwell, 216 N.C. 480, 5 S.E.2d 316 (1939); 2 G. GLENN, MORTGAGES,
DEEDS OF TRUST, AND OTHER SECURITY DEVICES AS TO LAND § 352, at 1459 (1943). But if the
security instrument is recorded prior to the first furnishing of labor or materials, the lender is
presumed to have the prior lien. E.g., McAdams v. Piedmont Trust Co., 167 N.C. 494, 83 S.E. 623
(1914). Cf. Frank H. Connor Co. v. Spanish Inns Charlotte, Ltd., 294 N.C. 661, 242 S.E.2d 785
(1978) (claimant had commenced visible improvement of the site by clearing and staking the
outline of the future construction before lender recorded deed of trust; materialman was awarded
the priority lien; court's attention to the date of recordation of the deed of trust implies that, if the
deed of trust had been recorded first, the statutory lien would have been subordinate).
3. Eg., Sontag v. Abbott, 140 Colo. 351, 344 P.2d 961 (1959); Society Linnea v. Wilbois, 253
Iowa 953, 113 N.W.2d 603 (1962); Noll v. Graham, 138 Kan. 676, 27 P.2d 277 (1933); Diversified
Mortgage Investors v. Lloyd D. Blaylock Gen. Contractor, 576 S.W.2d 794 (rex. 1978); Tomlin-
son v. Higginbotham Bros. & Co., 229 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
4. See generally Annot., 52 A.L.R. 693 (1928). The courts have, however, ruled that an
overeager purchaser could not cause a materialman's lien to take priority over a purchase money
deed of trust when the purchase money security instrument was executed, delivered, and recorded
with the deed as a part of the same transaction. Smith Builders Supply v. Rivenbark, 231 N.C.
213, 56 S.E.2d 431 (1949). When the same-transaction test was not met, the materiaiman's lien
took priority. Pegram-West, Inc. v. Hiatt Homes, 12 N.C. App. 519, 184 S.E.2d 65 (1971).
Smith Builders and Pegram- West arose under the former materialman's lien statute, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 44-41 (repealed 1969), and may have little precedential value under the current
statute. Furthermore, both suits involved purchase money deeds of trust rather than construction
loans. Purchase money deeds of trust have received special treatment in priority contests by oper-
ation of the doctrine of transitory (or instantaneous) seisin, which has yet to be applied to a con-
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The dilemma should not be left to the courts to resolve; a statutory
amendment should be enacted to clarify the matter. By amending G.S. 44A-
7(3)5 and 44A-10 6 to provide that the term "owner" shall be deemed to in-
clude persons who acquire title to the improved premises after contracting for
the improvements with the claimant, and that properly perfected material-
men's liens shall take priority over all security instruments other than
purchase money instruments filed subsequent to the claimant's first visible
commencement of work, the legislature could accomplish its dual goals of pro-
viding both certainty and equity7 to statutory lien claimants. Should the legis-
lature fail to correct this deficiency, however, the North Carolina courts may
eventually be faced with the task of sifting through opinions from other juris-
dictions in search of guidance to reach an equitable end.
If a court is faced with the task of construing North Carolina's material-
man's lien statute in a case involving an overeager purchaser, it will find that
the language of the current statute is ambiguous8 and may be construed to
permit any one of three mutually inconsistent results. First, the statute may
cause a materialman's lien to attach to a purchaser's subsequently acquired
title, and to take priority over a construction deed of trust filed simultaneously
with the deed.9 Second, the statute may cause the materialman's lien to at-
struction mortgage in North Carolina. See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL
ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 9.1 (3d ed. 1979); Urban & Miles, Mechanics'Lien for the Development of
Real Property: Recent Developments in Perfection, Enforcement and Priority, 12 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 283, 329-30 (1976); Annot., 72 A.L.R. 1516 (1931), supplemented by Annot., 73 A.L.R.2D
1407 (1960); see also 2 G. GLENN, MORTGAGES, DEEDS OF TRUST, AND OTHER SECURITY DE-
VICES AS TO LAND § 353 (1943); 1 L. JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAoES OF REAL
PROPERTY § 743, at 1110 (8th ed. 1928); 10 G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW
OF REAL PROPERTY § 5224, at 420-21 (1957). But see Sontag v. Abbott, 140 Colo. 351, 344 P.2d
961 (1959) (if the legislature had intended the purchase money deed of trust to be exempt from
operation of materialman's lien statute, it would have so provided).
In both Smith Builders and Pegram- West it was assumed that the materialman's lien should
attach to the overeager purchaser's after-acquired title. The issue whether the lien should arise at
all was not discussed in either opinion. Apparently the two courts and all parties agreed that an
overeager purchaser had the power to cause the lien to attach, but were divided over whether it
should take priority over a purchase money deed of trust.
Because the subject of priority contests between materialmen and purchase money lenders
has already been extensively treated by other authors, see authorities cited supra, this note will
focus primarily on the contest between construction lenders and materialmen.
5. See infra note 8; see also infra text accompanying note 99 for proposed amendment.
6. See supra note 2; see also infra text accompanying note 100 for proposed amendment.
7. See infra note 12.
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-8 (1976) is ambiguous in that it is unclear whether a purchaser
who orders the commencement of work before he acquires title is an "owner" within the meaning
of the statute. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-7(3) (1976) purports to define the term "owner," but still
leaves the instant question unresolved:
Unless the context otherwise requires in this Article. . . (3) An "owner" is a person who
has an interest in the real property improved and for whom an improvement is made and
who ordered the improvement to be made. "Owner" includes successors in interest of
the owner and agents of the owner acting within their authority.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-7(3) (1976) (emphasis added). It remains to be seen whether the North
Carolina appellate courts will find an overeager purchaser to have an "interest" that will support
the attachment of a materialman's lien.
9. See, e.g., Sontag v. Abbott, 140 Colo. 351,344 P.2d 961 (1959); Service Lumber & Supply
Co. v. Cox, 98 Fla. 405, 123 So. 820 (1929); Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. Metro Center, 303
N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1981); Noll v. Graham, 138 Kan. 676,27 P.2d 277 (1933); Chicago Lumber Co.
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tach, but not to take priority over the lender's lien.10 Third, the materialman's
lien may not arise at all if an overeager purchaser is not deemed to be an
owner within the statutory definition of that term. I I The first result is prefera-
ble since it comports with the purpose of the materialman's lien statute,1 2 but
it is a difficult one to reach because it requires both a finding that an overeager
purchaser is an owner for purposes of G.S. 44A-8 and a holding that construc-
tion lenders are not entitled to the benefit of the doctrine of instantaneous
seisin. t3
To illustrate the problem, imagine that A has entered into an agreement
to purchase from 0 a lot on which he intends to build a dwelling that he hopes
to sell later. A, having only enough capital to pay the purchase price of the
unimproved lot, arranges to receive from an institutional lender a construction
v. Fretz, 51 Kan. 134, 32 P. 908 (1893); Enlow v. Brown, 357 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962);
Tomlinson v. Higginbotham Bros. & Co., 229 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); Breckenridge
Cit Club v. Hardin, 253 S.W. 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); see also Anderson v. Berg, 174 Mass.
4, 54 N.E. 877 (1899) (materialman's lien attaches to the after-acquired title and relates back to
the making of the contract if the overeager purchaser ratifies the contract after he acquires title
and before the work is completed); Courtemanche v. Blackstone Valley St. Ry., 170 Mass. 50, 48
N.E. 937 (1898) (same); Callaway v. Evanson, 272 Wis. 251, 75 N.W.2d 456 (1956) (court's ruling
allowing the materialman's lien to attach to the overeager purchaser's subsequently acquired in-
terest in the improved premises was expressly mandated by the statute).
10. E.g., Sebastian Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Minten, 181 Ark. 700, 705, 27 S.W.2d 1011, 1013
(1930); Society Linnea v. Wilbois, 253 Iowa 953, 113 N.W.2d 603 (1962); Rochford v. Rochford,
188 Mass. 108, 74 N.E. 299 (1905).
11. Eg., Corbett v. Greenlaw, 117 Mass. 167 (1875); Hayes v. Fessenden, 106 Mass. 228
(1870); Howard v. Veazie, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 233 (1855); De Ronde v. Olmsted, 47 How. Pr. 175
(N.Y.C.P. 1874); Mahan v. Bitting, 103 W. Va. 449, 137 S.E. 889 (1927).
12. The purpose of the materialman's lien statute is to protect the laborer's interest in the
product of his own toil: "the [materialman] should have the benefit of the labor and materials that
go into the property and give it value, rather than the mortgagee, who has taken his mortgage
during the progress of the work." I L. JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES OF REAL
PROPERTY § 603, at 834 (8th ed. 1928).
The sole purpose of the relation back feature of the lien, see supra note 2, seems to be to rank
lien priority according to a logical, objective order. Certainty and specificity were the draftsmen's
goals. As one of the draftsmen has commented, "It is conceivable that the presently existing
statutory framework in some instances sacrifices equity for certainty, but it is submitted that un-
certainty can produce greater inequities." Humphrey, Position, Priorities and Protection of Parties
& Statutory Liens, in 1975 N.C. BAR ASS'N FOUND. INST. ON TROUBLED REAL ESTATE VENTURES
AND NEW USE AND OWNERSHIP CONCEPTS IV-I, -6 to -7.
To implement the purposes of the materialman's lien statutes, the courts must construe the
statutes in a manner that will further the legislature's intent and purposes. They are hampered in
this pursuit by vague and contradictory common-law rules of statutory construction. Generally,
statutes in derogation of the common law are construed strictly, but a remedial statute should
receive a construction that will advance the remedy. Wilmington Shipyard v. North Carolina
State Highway Comm'n, 6 N.C. App. 649, 171 S.E.2d 222 (1969);see Greene v. Town of Valdese,
306 N.C. 79, 291 S.E.2d 630 (1982) (intent of legislature controls interpretation of a statute); Bur-
gess v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 298 N.C. 520, 259 S.E.2d 248 (1979).
The cases cited in the preceding paragraph do not concern materialman's liens, and no North
Carolina case addresses the issue whether a materialman's lien statute should be construed strictly
or liberally. Most jurisdictions hold that materialman's lien acts are remedial in nature and
should be construed liberally. Eg., Mid-State Contractors v. Halo Dev. Corp., 342 So. 2d 1078
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Polivka Logan Designers v. Ende, 312 Minn. 171, 251 N.W.2d 851
(1977); Stone Fort Nat'l Bank v. Elliott Elec. Supply Co., 548 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
Some jurisdictions construe the statutes strictly when determining whether a lien attaches, and
liberally once the lien is deemed to have attached. E.g., Eastern Constr. Co. v. Cole, 52 Mich.
App. 346, 217 N.W.2d 108 (1974); Earp v. Vanderpool, 232 S.E.2d 513 (W. Va. 1977).
13. See infra notes 73-96 and accompanying text.
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loan to be secured by a first deed of trust on the property. A expects to repay
the loan out of the proceeds of the sale of the completed structure and retain
any excess for himself. Three weeks later the closing goes smoothly, but dur-
ing the interval 4 has taken advantage of favorable weather conditions by
hiring workers to lay the foundation and frame for the house. Eventually, cost
overruns and mismanagement exhaust the construction fund and deplete 4's
personal assets to the point tlfat he files for bankruptcy. The lender institutes
foreclosure proceedings. The unpaid materialmen perfect their claims, and M,
who commenced work prior to the closing and recordation of the deed of trust,
claims to have priority over the lien of the deed of trust.
The North Carolina materialman's lien statute, as it is currently phrased,
provides for a lien on real property improved by the materialman if the labor
or materials are furnished pursuant to a contract between the claimant and the
owner of the improved premises. 14 If A is found to be an owner within the
meaning of the materialman's lien statute, M will have a priority lien at least
to the extent ofA 's interest at the time the materialman's contract was made or
the work commenced,15 unless the doctrine of instantaneous seisin operates to
subordinate it.16 IfA is not an owner prior to acquisition of title, M may have
either a subordinate lien 7 that will be extinguished by the lender's foreclosure
on its lien, or he may have no lien at all.' 8 The threshold problem of the
overeager purchaser, then, is whether he is an owner for purposes of the stat-
ute creating such a lien.
To qualify as an owner, G.S. 44A-7 requires that.A must have "an inter-
est in the real property improved" and be a person "for whom the improve-
ment [was] made and who ordered the improvement to be made,"' 9 or be one
who is so situated that a fair reading of the statute would require that he be
deemed an owner.20 The portion of G.S. 44A-7 that purports to define the
term "owner" has not been construed by North Carolina's appellate courts.
Other jurisdictions, however, have reported opinions in similar circumstances,
and the results run the gamut of all the available possibilities.
Most jurisdictions agree that an enforceable executory contract to
purchase the real estate provides sufficient equitable "interest" to give the pur-
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-8 (1976). See supra note 2 for pertinent portion.
15. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 74-97 and accompanying text.
17. See supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also Inman v. Omdorff, 596 S.W.2d 236
(Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
18. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. The scope of this note is limited to an inquiry
into the purchaser's possible status as an owner under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-8 (1976) and the
ensuing priority contest if he is held to be such an owner. This note does not discuss the theory
that an overeager purchaser may be the functional equivalent of a general contractor, making
those whom he employs merely subcontractors who have no right to a lien against the real prop-
erty of the owner (except by subrogation). Consequently, the question whether an overeager pur-
chaser may shield his own after-acquired title from the attachment of materialmen's liens by
claiming to be his own general contractor is outside the scope of this note.
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-7(3) (1976). See supra note 8 for text.
20. .4 must have an interest in the real property "[u]nless the context otherwise requires in
this Article." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-7 (1976). See supra note 8 for statutory definition of
"owner."
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chaser ownership status for the purposes of the statute.21 But the courts di-
verge sharply on the following questions: (1) whether the owner's interest
must exist when the materialman's contract is made22 or when his work is
commenced, 23 or whether it is sufficient that the interest exist when the lien is
claimed;24 (2) if an interest must exist when the contract is made or the work
commenced, whether an unenforceable interest (e.g., an oral agreement to
purchase the real estate) is sufficient to support the lien;25 (3) whether the lien
first attaches to the owner's interest when the contract is made, when the work
is commenced, when the legal title is obtained, or when the claim of lien is
perfected or enforced;26 (4) if the lien attaches to the owner's interest when the
contract is made or the work commenced, whether it also attaches to any en-
largement of the owner's interest, such as, the addition of legal title to an ex-
isting equitable estate.27
The answers to such questions should be clearly discernable from the lan-
guage of the statute, and in some states they are.28 But in many jurisdictions
21. See supra note 9; infra note 43; see also Stockwell v. Carpenter, 27 Iowa 119 (1869). See
generally Annot., 2 A.L.R. 778, 794-98 (1919), supplemented by Annot., 95 A.L.R. 1085, 1095-98
(1935); Annot., 52 A.L.R. 693 (1928); Annot., 58 A.L.R. 911, 912-22 (1929), supplemented by An-
not., 102 A.L.R. 233, 234-37 (1936).
22. See Howard v. Veazie, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 233 (1855) (the interest must exist at the mo-
ment the contract is made or the lien will not attach); De Ronde v. Olmsted, 47 How. Pr. 175
(N.Y.C.P. 1874) (same).
23. See Diversified Mortgage Investors v. Lloyd D. Blaylock Gen. Contractor, 576 S.W.2d
794 (Tex. 1978) (lien cannot antedate acquisition of ownership interest in the land); see also infra
text accompanying notes 38-40.
24. See Chicago Lumber Co. v. Fretz, 51 Kan. 134, 32 P. 908 (1893) (no interest necessary at
the time contract is made because a subsequently acquired interest will support the lien and per-
mit it to relate back); Lemire v. McCollum, 246 Or. 418, 425 P.2d 755 (1967) (same); Tomlinson v.
Higginbotham Bros. & Co., 229 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) (same). But see infra text
accompanying notes 38-41.
25. See Sebastian Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Minten, 181 Ark. 700, 704-05, 27 S.W.2d 1011, 1013
(1930) (mere parol agreement to purchase, which does not reach the level of an enforceable execu-
tory contract, does not give materialman a lien that will relate back); Service Lumber & Supply
Co. v. Cox, 98 Fla. 405, 407 123 So. 820, 821 (1929) (dictum that the test of a sufficient interest is
its transferability; however, held that "[a] person in possession [of real estate] is presumed to have
an interest chargeable with a lien until the contrary is made to appear"); see also infra notes 42-54
and accompanying text.
26. See notes 55-64 and accompanying text. See generally 2 L. JONES, A TREATISE ON THE
LAw OF LIENS § 1259, at 455-57 (3d ed. 1914); 10 G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MOD-
ERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 5197, at 309-11 (1957).
27. See supra note 26.
28. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 13 11.01(A) (Page 1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 779.01(2)(d),
.01(4), .10 (West 1981).
Ohio's statutory definition of an owner expressly includes "all the interests either legal or
equitable, which such person may have in the real estate upon which the improvements contem-
plated under such sections are made, including the interests held by any person under contracts of
purchase, whether in writing or otherwise." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1311.01(A) (Page 1979)
(emphasis added); see Summer & Co. v. DCR Corp., 47 Ohio St. 2d 254, 351 N.E.2d 485 (1976).
Wisconsin's definition includes any interest in the improved property:
"Owner" means the owner of any interest in land who, personally or through an
agent, enters into a contract, express or implied, for the improvement of the land.
Agency will be presumed, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the con-
trary, between employer and employee, between spouses, between joint tenants and




they remain unresolved until litigation forces the courts to speak to matters
upon which the statutes are silent.29 In North Carolina none of these ques-
tions is answered on the face of the applicable statutes, so courts must resort to
decisions in other states to predict how these questions might be answered by
the local judiciary.
Courts have disagreed on the issue of when a purchaser's interest must
exist in order to create preferred materialmen's liens. An early West Virginia
opinion stated that when work was performed and completed, and the claim of
lien filed, before the purchaser acquired his "interest," the lien could not at-
tach to the interest thereafter acquired.30 In so holding, the court reasoned
that the lien must attach on the date it is filed. Distinguishing a materialman's
lien from a judgment lien, the court stated:
The lien could only attach to [the purchaser's] interest in the land
when filed, and not against her personally, and thus be kept alive. It
could not be wandering around in the air ready to descend upon land
afterwards acquired. A [materialman's] lien must have something on
which it may attach, else it is not a lien.31
Early decisions of the Massachusetts 32 and New York3 3 courts stated that
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 779.01(2)(d) (West 1981) (emphasis added). Wisconsin's statutory scheme ex-
pressly measures priority from the visible commencement of improvement, WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 779.01(4) (West 1981), and declares that a judgment emanating from foreclosure of the lien shall
extend to and include the interests that the owner may have acquired in the property after the
visible commencement of construction, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 779.10 (West 1981).
Priority of construction lien. The lien provided in sub. (3) shall be prior to any lien
which originates subsequent to the visible commencement in place of the work of improve-
ment .... [C]ommencement is deemed to occur no earlier than the beginning of sub-
stantial excavation for the foundations, footings or base of the new construction ...
Lien claimants who perform work or procure its performance or furnish any labor or
materials or plans or specifications for an improvement prior to the visible commence-
ment of the work of improvement shall have lien rights, but shall have only the priority
accorded to to other lien claimants.
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 779.01(4) (West 1981) (emphasis added).
The judgement shall adjudge the amount due to each claimant who is a party to the
action. It shall direct that the interest of the owner in the premises at the commencement
of the work or furnishing the materials for which liens are given and which the owner has
since acquired, or so much thereof as is necessary, be sold to satisfy the judgement, and
that the proceeds be brought into court with the report of sale to abide the order of the
court.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 779.10 (West 1981) (emphasis added); see Callaway v. Evanson, 272 Wis. 251,
75 N.W.2d 456 (1956) (construing Wis. STAT. ANN. § 289.12 (now codified at § 779.10)).
29. E.g., Society Linnea v. Wilbois, 253 Iowa 953, 113 N.W.2d 603 (1962) (construing IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 572.1(1), 572.2 (West 1950); § 572.1(1) fails to describe the interest necessary to
qualify as an "owner," and § 572.2 fails to define the moment of attachment of the lien); Tomlin-
son v. Higginbotham Bros. & Co., 229 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) (construing TEX. CONST.
art. 16, § 37 and TEx. CIv. CODE ANN. § 5452 (Vernon 1958 & Supp. 1982-83), which fails to
define "owner" or identify the effective date of the materialman's lien); Mahan v. Bitting, 103 W.
Va. 449, 137 S.E. 889 (1927) (construing chapter 75 of the 1923 Code of West Virginia, now
codified at W. VA. CODE §§ 38-2-1 to -39 (1966), which fails to define "owner" and also fails to
state whether a materialman's lien may attach to an interest acquired after commencement of
construction).
30. Mahan v. Bitting, 103 W. Va. 449, 137 S.E. 889 (1927).
31. Id at 455, 137 S.E. at 891.
32. Corbett v. Greenlaw, 117 Mass. 167 (1875); Hayes v. Fessenden, 106 Mass. 228 (1870);
Howard v. Veazie, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 233 (1855).
33. De Ronde v. Olmsted, 47 How. Pr. 175 (N.Y.C.P. 1874).
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an interest sufficient to qualify one for ownership must exist at the moment the
materialman's contract is made. Otherwise no lien can arise under the statute.
The rationale depended upon the assumption that the lien attaches when the
contract is made and cannot attach thereafter. This approach, however, ig-
nores the versatility of the relation back doctrine, which may permit a lien to
attach on one date and relate back to a previous date for purposes of discern-
ing the priorities of the claimants. 34 Subsequent to those early cases, Massa-
chusetts has used the relation back doctrine to the materialman's advantage by
coupling it with the contract ratification theory. Thus, if the overeager pur-
chaser ratifies his materialman's contract after acquiring a suitable interest in
the property, the lien will attach and relate back to the date the contract was
made.35
The Florida Supreme Court has held that the materialman's lien "at-
taches to whatever interest the owner had when the work was begun and to
another or greater interest whenever acquired before the lien is enforced." '36
Furthermore, the materialman is given the benefit of a presumption that the
person who hired him had the requisite interest to qualify as an owner from
the outset: "A person in possession is presumed to have an interest chargeable
with a lien until the contrary is made to appear."'37
The courts of Kansas and Oregon have boldly held that no interest is
necessary at the time the contract is made or the work commenced because
any subsequently acquired interest will support the lien and permit it to relate
34. Eg., Chicago Lumber Co. v. Fretz, 51 Kan. 134,32 P. 908 (1893) (defendant's acquisition
of title a few days before construction was completed caused materialman's lien to attach and
relate back to the time of the making of the contract, even though defendant had no ownership
interest when the contract was made). But see Diversified Mortgage Investors v. Lloyd D.
Blaylock Gen. Contractor, 576 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1978) (materialman's lien cannot relate back to a
time prior to the owner's acquisition of an interest).
In North Carolina, the relation back doctrine evolved as a creature of case law, and was later
codified at G.S. § 44A-10. Humphrey, supra note 12, at IV-8. Judge Ervin's statement of the
doctrine in Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Basnight, 234 N.C. 347, 351, 67 S.E.2d 390, 394
(1951), served as the legislature's guide in drafting G.S. § 44A-10. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-10
(1976) (quoted supra note 2); see also infra note 70. In Basnight, Judge Ervin described the doc-trine as follows:
The doctrine is inherent in the very statutes which give the contractor the lien upon
the property improved by his labor or materials, and allow him six months after the
completion of the labor or the final furnishing of the materials in which to claim it; for it
is plain that unless the contractor's lien when filed relates back to the time at which the
contractor commenced the performance of the work or the furnishing of the materials, the
object of the statutes can be defeated at the will of the owner of the property, by his selling or
encumbering his estate. To hold that the doctrine of relation back is not inherent in these
statutes would be to "keep the word of promise to our ear, and break it to our hope."
Equitable Life Assurance Soe'y v. Basnight, 234 N.C. 347, 351, 67 S.E.2d 390, 394 (1951) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added). For an example of the doctrine's application in the overeager pur-
chaser's situation, see Pegram-West, Inc. v. Hiatt Homes, 12 N.C. App. 519, 184 S.E.2d 65 (1971)
(decided prior to the enactment of G.S. § 44A-10). See also supra note 4.
35. E.g., Anderson v. Berg, 174 Mass. 404, 54 N.E. 877 (1899); Courtemanche v. Blackstone
Valley St. Ry., 170 Mass. 50, 48 N.E. 937 (1898).




back to the earlier time.38 The Texas judiciary once subscribed to this view,39
but has since retreated from this stance.40 Texas law now holds that the lien
cannot relate back to a time prior to the owner's acquisition of an interest.41
Concerning the question of what minimum interest is necessary to sup-
port the lien, some early Massachusetts and New York cases held that nothing
short of legal title would suffice to make one an owner for purposes of the
statute.4 2 In most states, however, a purchaser in possession under an enforce-
able written contract of sale is regarded as having equitable title that is suffi-
cient to qualify him as an owner within the provisions of the materialman's
lien statutes. 43 In Hessinger v. Sorenson44 the Supreme Court of North Da-
kota intimated that the holder of the equitable title, not the legal titleholder,
should be the only person empowered to subject the property to a material-
man's lien.45 In Service Lumber & Supply Co. v. COX46 a Florida court held
that the test for an interest sufficient to constitute ownership should be whether
the person's interest is transferable.47 A Colorado court in Sontag v. Abbott
4 8
held that an optionee had a sufficient interest in the property to create a lien
superior to a deed of trust filed with the optionee's deed.49 One who has only
a "vague verbal understanding" with the titleholder for the purchase of real
property, however, may lack even the equitable title necessary to qualify as an
38. Chicago Lumber Co. v. Fretz, 51 Kan. 134, 32 P. 908 (1893); Lemire v. McCollum, 246
Or. 418, 429-30, 425 P.2d 755, 760 (1967).
39. Tomlinson v. Higginbotham Bros. & Co., 229 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) (the
court ignored the problem of determining when the lien attached but simply declared that it did
attach to the full extent of the purchaser's after-acquired title, and related back to the moment the
work was commenced); see also Irving Lumber Co. v. Alltex Mortgage Co., 468 S.W.2d 341, 344
(Tex. 1971) (McGee, J., dissenting).
40. Diversified Mortgage Investors v. Lloyd D. Blaylock Gen. Contractor, 576 S.W.2d 794
(Tex. 1978); Irving Lumber Co. v. Alltex Mortgage Co., 468 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 1971); Inman v.
Orndorff, 596 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
4 1. See supra note 40.
42. Hayes v. Fessenden, 106 Mass. 228 (1870); Thaxter v. Williams, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 49
(1833); Miller v. Mead, 127 N.Y. 544, 28 N.E. 387 (1891).
43. Eg., Sebastian Bldg. & Loan Ass'n-v. Minten, 181 Ark. 700, 27 S.W.2d 1011 (1930);
Sullivan v. Thomas Org., P.C., 88 Mich. App. 77, 276 N.W.2d 522 (1979); Summer & Co. v. DCR
Corp., 47 Ohio St. 2d 254, 351 N.E.2d 485 (1976); Lemire v. McCollum, 246 Or. 418, 425 P.2d 755
(1967); Westfair Corp. v. Kuelz, 90 Wis. 2d 631, 280 N.W.2d 364 (Ct. App. 1979); see Annot., 95
A.L.R. 1085, 1095 (1935). But see C.R. Stocks, Inc. v. Blakely's Matterhorn, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 118,
279 N.W.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1979) (rights of a purchaser under an executory contract to purchase
land do not constitute an "interest in land" to which a lien can attach).
44. 180 N.W.2d 910 (N.D. 1970).
45. Id at 915: "Section 35-1201 of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943 defines 'owner'
for the purpose of the [materialman's] lien chapter as being someone other than the mere holder of
legal title. The vendee under an executory contract of sale is the equitable owner of the land
The vendee is defined as the owner... and the vendor is not the owner within the purview
of this [materialman's] lien law."
46. 98 Fla. 405, 123 So. 820 (1929).
47. Accord Geissinger v. Robins, 274 Minn. 215, 218, 143 N.W.2d 50, 53 (1966) ("ownership
... has been broadly interpreted to include any interest which the court may order sold").
48. 140 Colo. 351, 344 P.2d 961 (1959).
49. But see Gentry Bros. v. Byron Dev. Corp., 16 N.C. App. 386, 192 S.E.2d 100 (1972) (if
optionee never exercises option, or otherwise acquires any ownership in the land, materialman
may not enforce his lien).
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"owner" under the statute.50
Some courts draw a distinction whereby they permit the lien to attach if
the purchaser holds an equitable title under an enforceable executory con-
tract,5 ' but deny the lien if the purchaser has only an unenforceable agreement
to purchase that is later fully executed.52 This distinction can be criticized as
overly technical since neither circumstance can be reasonably said to have in-
fluenced the parties' behavior. It should not be expected that, prior to con-
tracting with a homebuilder, a laborer or supplier of materials who is unversed
in legal theories of ownership will undertake a costly and time-consuming title
examination, or demand from a prospective employer or customer proof that
he has equitable title to the building site.53 Instead, a more appropriate rule
has been adopted by the courts of Oregon and Kansas: any subsequently ac-
quired interest will support a materialman's lien even if no enforceable interest
in the property existed when the contract was made or the work was
commenced.5 4
The other side of the owner's interest question concerns the moment of
attachment of the lien. If a court holds that an ownership interest must exist at
the instant the materialman's work commences, does that mean that the lien
attaches at that moment to whatever interest the overeager purchaser may
own? If it does attach at that instant, may it then grow in scope as the owner's
interest grows? If the lien does not attach when the contract is made, does it
attach when the claim of lien is filed or perfected?
In Mahan v. Bilting55 the West Virginia Supreme Court held that the lien
attached at the moment the claimant filed his lien, and if the purchaser had no
interest at that time, the lien could not attach to any subsequently acquired
interest. The facts of the case were unusual because construction was actually
completed and the lien filed before the purchaser acquired any interest (legal
or equitable) that the court was willing to recognize. The claimant in Mahan
unsucessfully argued that the lien should attach and inure to his benefit in
much the same way that estoppel by deed vests title in a grantee who accepts
and records a deed from a grantor who has no title at the time, but thereafter
acquires it.56 More recently, in Lyon v. Dunn57 the Maine Supreme Court
50. 2 L. JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LIENS § 1259, at 456 (3d ed. 1914); 10 G.
THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 5197, at 309 (1957). See Sebastian Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Minten, 181
Ark. 700, 27 S.W.2d 1011 (1930).
51. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 47 & 50 and accompanying text.
53. But see Lyon v. Dunn, 402 A.2d 461, 463 (Me. 1979) ("It is ... incumbent upon a mate-
rialman seeking to establish a lien, to determine the extent of the contracting party's interest in the
land.").
54. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
55. 103 W. Va. 449, 137 S.E. 889 (1927).
56. Id at 454, 137 S.E. at 891:
Plaintiff contends that. . . his lien. . . immediately attached to the lot when the title
thereto was afterwards transferred to Irene. . . under analogy to the principle applica-
ble where a person not having title to land deeds it to another and afterwards obtains
title thereto; the title afterwards so obtained passes by operation of law to his prior
grantee ....
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construed its materialman's lien statute to mean that the lien attaches to the
contracting party's interest at the moment the work commences. In Lyon the
court held that "'ownership'. . . refers to ownership at the time services are
first provided," and if the contracting party "has no interest in the land or its
improvements. . . the lien has nothing to attach to and becomes a nullity. 5 8
Consequently, no lien arose against an overeager purchaser's interest even
though he acquired legal title within the statutory period provided for filing
claims of lien.
Early Massachusetts and New York cases held that the lien attached to
the owner's interest at the moment the contract was made and could not attach
to any new interest acquired thereafter.59 If an equitable title was the only
ownership interest held by an overeager purchaser when his contract with the
materialman was made, the materialman's lien could attach only to the equita-
ble title, leaving the purchaser's subsequently acquired legal title free of the
lien.60 In later years the Massachusetts courts retreated from this strict ap-
proach and embraced theories that permit the materialman's lien to attach to
the after-acquired legal title.61 Many courts have followed suit by holding
that a materialman's lien which is attached to a purchaser's equitable estate
also attaches to his subsequently acquired legal estate.62 Other courts have
held that the lien attaches at the moment the purchaser acquires a judicially
recognized interest, 63 but have split on the issue whether the lien may then, for
purposes of priority, relate back to a time when the purchaser owned no inter-
est. 64 Some courts do permit the lien to relate back,65 but in jurisdictions
A clearer statement of the principle of estoppel by deed was penned by Judge Hedrick in
Meachem v. Boyce, 35 N.C. App. 506, 508, 241 S.E.2d 880, 882 (1970): "a grantor who is unable
to convey a valid title to the property at the time of conveyance is estopped from denying the
validity of the deed when he subsequently acquires the right to convey it." Thus, if A, who owns
no interest in Blackacre, gives to B a deed purporting to convey Blackacre to B in fee simple in
exchange for valuable consideration, the deed is ineffective to convey an estate to B, but equity
will treat the the purported deed as a valid contract to convey the land to B. IfA later acquires an
interest in Blackacre, equity will declare the contract effective as a deed under the maxim "equity
regards as done that which ought to be done," id at 511, 241 S.E.2d at 883, andA will be estopped
from denying the passage of his after-acquired title to B, his prior grantee. In the end, B receives
by operation of law any interest A obtains in Blackacre after delivery of the deed.
57. 402 A.2d 461 (Me. 1979).
58. Id at 463-64. (emphasis deleted).
59. Howard v. Veazie, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 233 (1855); accord De Ronde v. Olimsted, 47 How.
Pr. 175 (N.Y.C.P. 1874).
60. Hayes v. Fessenden, 106 Mass. 228 (1870).
61. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (concerning the Massachusetts courts' use of
the contract ratification theory). See also Rochford v. Rochford, 188 Mass. 108, 74 N.E. 299
(1905) (permitting materialian's lien to attach when title was acquired, but subordinating it to the
lien of a mortgage attaching at the same time).
62. E.g., Service Lumber & Supply Co. v. Cox, 98 Fla. 405, 123 So. 820 (1929); Summer &
Co. v. DCR Corp., 47 Ohio St. 2d 254, 351 N.E.2d 485 (1976); Diversified Mortgage Investors v.
Lloyd D. Blaylock Gen. Contractor, 576 S.W.2d 794 (rex. 1978); see Mahan v. Bitting, 103 W. Va.
449, 137 S.E. 889 (1927) (dictum); see also 2 L. JoNaS, supra note 50, § 1259, at 457; 10 G. THOMP-
SON, supra note 4, § 5197, at 310.
63. E.g., Sebastian Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Minten, 181 Ark. 700, 27 S.W.2d 1011 (1930);
Society Linnea v. Wilbois, 253 Iowa 953, 113 N.W.2d 603 (1962); Rochford v. Rochford, 188
Mass. 108, 74 N.E. 299 (1905).
64. See, e.g., Chicago Lumber Co. v. Fretz, 51 Kan. 134, 32 P. 908 (1893) (relation back
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where the lien is not permitted to relate back 66 most courts have held the ma-
terialman's lien subordinate to mortgages and deeds of trust that attached to
the property at the same moment as the materialman's lien.
67
North Carolina's relation back doctrine has been codified at G.S. 44A-
10,68 but the applicable language does not identify the moment of attachment
of the lien, nor does it indicate whether the legislature intended to permit the
lien to relate back to a time prior to the "owner's" acquisition of legal title. It
is arguable that the statutory language "shall relate to and take effect from the
time of the first furnishing of labor or materials" 69 means that the lien attaches
upon commencement of work, and only attaches to such interest as the "own-
er" had at that time. It seems more likely, however, that the draftsmen neither
thought about after-acquired title problems nor attempted to mark the invisi-
ble moment of attachment. The words probably were intended to mandate
only a simple scheme for ranking liens in a logical order of priority, regardless
of when, or to what interest, the Hen technically attached.
70
In North Carolina, if the materialman's lien is permitted to attach to an
overeager purchaser's after-acquired title, but not permitted to relate back to
the lien claimant's commencement of work in accordance with G.S. 44A- 10,71
the liens of all materialmen who commence work prior to the owner's acquisi-
tion of title would attach to the property simultaneously at the moment the
purchaser's deed is filed. In the same instant, any deeds of trust executed,
delivered, and recorded contemporaneously with the deed would also attach,
72
as would all previously docketed money judgments against the purchaser.73
permitted); Diversified Mortgage Investors v. Lloyd D. Blaylock Gen. Contractor, 576 S.W.2d 794
(Tex. 1978) (relation back denied).
65. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
66. See Diversified Mortgage Investors v. Lloyd D. Blaylock Gen. Contractor, 576 S.W.2d
794 (Tex. 1978).
67. Id
68. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-10 (1976); see supra note 2 & 34; infra note 69.
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-10 (1976) (emphasis added).
70. See Humphrey, supra note 12, at IV-8. Mr. Humphrey, one of the statute's draftsmen,
made no reference to the moment of attachment in his comment on this provision, but focused
exclusively on the importance of the relation back feature for purposes of determining priority
among competing liens.
71. See supra note 2.
72. See, e.g., Smith Builders Supply v. Rivenbark, 231 N.C. 213, 56 S.E.2d 431 (1949) (lien of
purchase money deed of trust attaches instantaneously to title when executed, delivered, and re-
corded with deed as part of same transaction).
73. E.g., H. Weil & Bros. v. Casey, 125 N.C. 356, 34 S.E. 506 (1899); see Dula v. Parsons, 243
N.C. 32, 35, 89 S.E.2d 797, 799 (1955) ("A docketed judgment, directing the payment of money, is
a lien on the real property situated in the county in which the judgment is docketed and owned by
the judgment debtor at the time the judgment is docketed, or on such land as is acquired by hiln at
any time within tenyears from the date of the rendition of the judgment.") (emphasis added); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1-234 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (same).
It is arguable that, if both the materialman's lien and the lender's lien attach simultaneously,
priority might be determined by applying the same rules that govern priority contests between
simultaneously attaching judgment liens and lender's liens. Generally, judgment liens attaching
to a debtor's after-acquired title are given priority over simultaneously attaching mortgages and
deeds of trust unless the mortgages are given to secure the purchase price of the property. E.g.,
Yarlott v. Brown, 86 Ind. App. 479, 149 N.E. 921 (1925); Fidelity Union Title & Mortgage Guar-
anty Co. v. Magnifico, 106 N.J. Eq. 559, 151 A. 499 (1930); H. Weil & Bros. v. Casey, 125 N.C.
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The question then arises how the North Carolina courts would determine the
priorities among the competing lien claimants. The answer depends largely
upon the court's use of the doctrine of instantaneous (or transitory) seisin.74
The doctrine, which will be discussed more fully in subsequent paragraphs, 75
provides that when a deed and purchase money deed of trust are executed,
delivered, and recorded as part of the same transaction, the deed of trust at-
taches at the instant the purchaser acquires title and constitutes a lien superior
to all others incurred by the mortgagor.76 Historically, the doctrine has been
applied almost exclusively in favor of purchase money security instruments,
and has seldom been extended to include construction deeds of trust or other
nonpurchase money security interests. 77 By applying the doctrine of instanta-
neous seisin to sort out priorities among competing liens attaching at the same
instant, the North Carolina courts probably would hold that a purchase money
deed of trust satisfying the same-transaction test is superior to judgment
liens7 8 and materialmen's liens,79 while judgment liens would probably reign
over nonpurchase money deeds of trust.3 0 Whether materialmen's liens would
356, 34 S.E. 506 (1899). One reason that may be advanced for treating judgment liens and materi-
almen's liens alike in such situations is that a lender can readily discover both types of liens prior
to closing if he searches public docket books in the county where the land lies for outstanding
judgments against the prospective mortgagor, see Fidelity Union Title & Mortgage Guaranty Co.
v. Magnifico, 106 N.J. Eq. 559, 151 A. 499 (1930), and also inspects the property to determine
whether any work that might give rise to a materialman's lien has commenced at the site, see infra
note 95 and accompanying text. A nonpurchase money lender who foregoes his opportunity to
discover potential liens against the property, and to demand the satisfaction of inchoate liens prior
to closing, might equitably be held to have a subordinate lien to others attaching in the same
instant, regardless o their character as judgment liens or materialmen's liens. Cf. Fidelity Union
Title & Mortgage Guaranty Co. v. Magnifico, 106 N.J. Eq. 559, 151 A. 499 (1930) (future ad-
vances deed of trust held subordinate to judgment lien because lender had constructive notice of
mortgagor's judgment debts, and also because the purpose of the judgment lien statute would be
defeated if the lender were awarded priority).
74. See supra note 4. G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 4, § 9.1 is espe-
cially informative on the theory of instantaneous (or transitory) seisin.
75. See infra notes 83-95 and accompanying text.
76. E.g., Smith Builders Supply v. Rivenbark, 231 N.C. 213, 56 S.E.2d 431 (1949) (material-
man's lien incurred by overeager purchaser is subordinate to lien of subsequent purchase money
deed of trust when deed of trust is executed, delivered, and recorded with deed as part of same
transaction); H. Weil & Bros. v. Casey, 125 N.C. 536, 34 S.E. 506 (1899) (purchase money deed of
trust is entitled to priority over judgment lien, but nonpurchase money deed of trust is
subordinate); Pegram-West, Inc. v. Hiatt Homes, 12 N.C. App. 519, 184 S.E.2d 65 (1971) (lapse of
eleven days between recording of deed and purchase money deed of trust permitted materialman's
lien to take priority over the deed of trust lien because the deed and deed of trust were not exe-
cuted, delivered, and recorded as part of the same transaction); see supra note 4.
77. Eg., Yarlott v. Brown, 86 Ind. App. 479, 149 N.E. 921 (1925) (nonpurchase money mort-
gage executed, delivered, and recorded simultaneously with deed held not entitled to the priority
status that a purchase money mortgage would enjoy under otherwise identical circumstances);
Fidelity Union Title & Mortgage Guaranty Co. v. Magnifico, 106 N.J. Eq. 559, 562, 151 A. 499,
500 (1930) (future advances mortgage filed simultaneously with deed is not entitled to priority
over other liens attaching at the same moment, but purchase money deed of trust filed simultane-
ously with deed is entitled to priority); H. Weil & Bros. v. Casey, 125 N.C. 356, 34 S.E. 506 (1899)(nonpurchase money mortgage recorded simultaneously with deed held not entitled to priority
over a judgment lien attaching to title in the same instant, but if mortgage had been given to
secure purchase price, it would have been entitled to priority); see also infra notes 87-88 and
accompanying text.
78. E.g., H. Weil & Bros. v. Casey, 125 N.C. 356, 34 S.E. 506 (1899); see also supra note 76.
79. See supra note 73; see also infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 77.
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be superior to nonpurchase money deeds of trust depends upon the courts'
willingness to extend the instantaneous seisin doctrine to apply to nonpurchase
money security instruments. 8' The decision, in turn, should depend upon the
courts' assessment of the doctrine's policy foundation, 82 and not simply its
technical rationale.
The technical rationale for the doctrine of instantaneous seisin is that
when a purchaser simultaneously accepts a deed and conveys a security inter-
est in the property acquired, there is never a moment when the grantee named
in the deed holds title unencumbered by the lender's lien.8 3 Stated another
way, the moment of vesting of title is too brief to permit the lien of the materi-
alman to squeeze ahead of the lender's lien. Obviously, the technical rationale
for the doctrine is somewhat unsatisfactory. Since vesting and attachment are
both fictional legal processes, any race for priority between a materialman's
lien and a deed of trust is likewise a purely fictional event. Certainly if the
materialman's lien can be said to have attached to the purchaser's equitable
title before receipt of the deed,8 4 the concept of an attachment race occurring
at the moment legal title vests becomes illogical.8 5
The meritorious policy foundation for the doctrine of instantaneous seisin
has, however, generally overridden the problems inherent in the technical ra-
tionale. The policy argument supporting the doctrine is historically associated
only with instruments securing purchase money loans. It is generally deemed
equitable and just that a vendor, who has parted with his property on the faith
of having a first priority security interest in it until he receives the purchase
price, should be protected from the possibility of losing both his land and his
money in the transaction. 86 Without the assurance that he would be able to
foreclose on the land if the money were not paid, the vendor would never have
parted with his property in the first place. Even if the purchase money loan is
made by a third party institutional lender, the reliance argument is equally
81. See supra notes 63 & 66 and accompanying text (materialman's lien junior to construc-
tion loan attaching in the same moment). But see supra note 77 and accompanying text; Noll v.
Graham, 138 Kan. 676,27 P.2d 277 (1933) (where deed of trust covered both purchase money and
construction funds, the portion of principal that covered purchase money was superior to materi-
alman's lien, but materialman's lien was superior to remainder); Diversified Mortgage Investors v.
Lloyd D. Blaylock Gen. Contractor, 576 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1978).
82. See infra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
83. G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 4, § 9.1 at 575.
84. See supra notes 26, 36 & 43 and accompanying text.
85. Some *courts have employed strained reasoning to harmonize the fiction with the results
their opinions reach. Thus, when an enforceable contract of sale occurs prior to the accrual of the
materialman's lien, the vendor is said to acquire an equitable right to have the contract enforced
and to obtain the purchase money mortgage on taking title. The vendor's equitable right to the
purchase money deed of trust supports the superiority of the actual deed of trust given at closing.
A third party lender of purchase money funds is awarded the same priority status as a vendor
lender on the theory that he stands in the position of an assignee of the vendor's equitable interest.
But the technical foundation for the doctrine breaks down if a purchase money deed of trust is
awarded priority even though there was no enforceable contract of sale and no equitable vendor's
lien available in the jurisdiction's body of laws. G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra
note 4, § 9.1 at 577; see also Rudasill v. Cabiniss, 225 N.C. 87, 33 S.E.2d 475 (1945) (equitable
vendor's lien does not exist in North Carolina).
86. G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 4, § 9.1 at 577.
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persuasive: the lender would never have loaned the money and the mortgagee
would never have acquired title without the assurance that the lender would
have first recourse to the land if the principal and interest were not paid.87
The purchase money lender looks to the value of the property in existence
at the time of the closing for his security. Construction lenders rely on a secur-
ity interest in a structure to be built in the future. Perhaps for that reason the
instantaneous seisin doctrine has generally been limited to instruments that
secure purchase money funds, not construction loan funds.88 When construc-
tion funds and purchase money funds are secured by the same deed of trust, at
least one court has refused to elevate any part of the lender's lien to a position
of priority over a previously existing materialman's lien.89 Even when the
deed of trust secures only purchase money funds, some courts have not permit-
ted the judicial doctrine of instantaneous seisin to subordinate a statutory ma-
terialman's lien to a subsequently filed security instrument.90
Clearly the technical rationale for the instantaneous seisin doctrine 91
poses no greater obstacle for a constuction deed of trust than for a purchase
money deed of trust. If a purely mechanical test is applied,92 a construction
deed of trust executed and recorded with the deed of conveyance as a part of
the same transaction should be given the same priority available to a purchase
money security instrument. But the purpose of the doctrine93 and current ju-
dicial trends respecting construction lending militate against extending the in-
stantaneous seisin rule to benefit construction lenders.
The trend in the law today is to protect the materialman's interest in the
87. Id at 578.
88. Eg., Snodgress v. Huff, 218 Ark. 113, 234 S.W.2d 505 (1950) (contractor who drilled a
well for an overeager purchaser did not even attempt to argue that his materialman's lien should
take priority over a subsequently executed purchase money deed of trust); Noll v. Graham, 138
Kan. 676, 27 P.2d 277 (1933) (when deed of trust covered both purchase money and construction
funds, the portion of principal that covered purchase money was superior to materialman's lien,
but materialman's lien was superior to remainder); Diversified Mortgage Investors v. Lloyd D.
Blaylock Gen. Contractor, 576 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1978). Cf. Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. Metro
Center, 303 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1981) (even though mortgage secured purchase money funds to-
gether with construction funds, entire mortgage was held subordinate to the materialman's lien).
89. Sontag v. Abbott, 140 Colo. 351, 344 P.2d 961 (1959);see also Northwestern Nat'l Bank v.
Metro Center, 303 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1981). But see Noll v. Graham, 136 Kan. 676, 27 P.2d 277
(1933); Diversified Mortgage Investors v. Lloyd D. Blaylock Gen. Contractor, 576 S.W.2d 794
(Tex. 1978).
90. See Sontag v. Abbott, 140 Colo. 351, 358, 344 P.2d 961, 965 (1959) (whether a deed of
trust is a purchase money deed of trust, in whole or in part, does not alter result that material-
man's lien on overeager purchaser's interest is superior to the subsequently filed security instru-
ment; if the legislature had intended purchase money deed of trust to be exempt from operation of
materialman's lien statute, it would have so provided); see also Sheridan, Inc. v. Palchanis, 172 So.
2d 872 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (implying that the materialman's lien would have been superior
to the subsequent purchase money deed of trust if the work performed had been of a "visible"
nature); Braden Co. v. Lancaster Lumber Co., 170 Okla. 30, 38 P.2d 575 (1934) (materialman's
lien will prevail over the subsequent deed of trust, but only to the extent of the value added by the
work).
91. See supra text accompanying note 83.
92. The mechanical test that has developed in North Carolina requires that the deed and
deed of trust be executed, delivered, and recorded as part of the same transaction. See supra note
4.
93. See supra note 86-87 and accompanying text.
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fruit of his labor by viewing the construction loan as a fund for the benefit of
the materialman. Thus, some courts now require the construction lender to
protect the mortgagor against materialmen's liens by burdening the lender
with an affirmative duty to see that the materialmen are compensated for their
work. 94 To obtain priority in such a jurisdiction, the construction lender must
be sure that work has not commenced prior to recordation of his deed of
trust.95 An extension of the instantaneous seisin doctrine would undercut this
policy by permitting a lender to acquire and foreclose a superior lien, extin-
guishing the lien of a materialman whose valuable improvement of the prop-
erty was visible at the time the deed of trust was recorded. Such a result is
inequitable largely because of the relative positions, expectations, and areas of
expertise of the materialman and construction lender. Generally speaking, the
lender (particularly an institutional lender) may be expected to have the so-
phistication and resources to examine the title and inspect the construction site
prior to investing in the venture. The lender also possesses the substantial
ability to force an overeager purchaser to pay his materialmen and obtain lien
waivers by refusing to close the loan in the event of noncompliance. The ma-
terialman may have none of these advantages. Furthermore, the proceeds
from a lender's foreclosure sale may be greatly increased by the existence of
the improvements constructed on the land by the materialman's labor. Conse-
quently, awarding a priority lien to the lender in an overeager purchaser's case
may amount to unjust enrichment of the lender and the purchaser at the mate-
rialman's expense. Presumably, it was considerations such as these that led
some legislators and judges to promote the materiaiman's interest by refusing
to give construction loans priority over materialmen's liens, 9 6 even when the
deed of trust is recorded first.9 7
The questions whether an overeager purchaser may qualify as an owner
for purposes of attachment of a materialman's lien, and whether such a lien
should be superior to a constuction loan deed of trust filed contemporaneously
with the deed are questions the North Carolina appellate courts have not yet
addressed and should not be required to answer. Since the stated goals of the
materialman's lien statute are to provide certainty and equity to statutory lien
claimants, 98 the legislature should promulgate amendments to provide cer-
tainty on these points. Appropriate amendments should include the following:
1. The term "owner" shall also be deemed to include persons who
94. R. KRATOVIL, MODERN MORTGAGE LAW & PRACTICE § 214, at 138, 141 (1972).
95. Id at 140-41 (advising preclosing inspection of property); G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D.
WHITMAN, supra note 4, § 12.4, at 739 (advising lender to inspect and photograph the property for
future proof that no visible commencement of work had taken place at the time of the security
instrument's recordation); see also Allen & Lunsford, Construction Lending, Future Advances and
Statutory Liens, in 1979 N.C. BAR ASS'N FOUND. INST. ON MODERN REAL PROPERTY PRACTICE
XII-1, -3 (encouraging lender's preclosing inspection of the premises).
96. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
97. See Ward v. Yarnelle, 173 Ind. 535, 91 N.E. 7 (1910) (materialmen's liens enjoy equal
rank (parity) with the construction deed of trust); H.B. Deal Constr. Co. v. Labor Discount
Center, 418 S.W.2d 940 (Mo. 1967) (lender's grant of construction loan creates presumption that
he has subordinated his security interest to the materialmen's liens).
98. See supra note 12.
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acquire an interest in the improved realty after contracting for the
improvements with the lien claimant. 99
2. Liens granted by this Article shall relate to and take effect from,
and their priority over competing liens shall be measured from, the
time of the first furnishing of labor or materials at the site of the
improvement by the person claiming the lien. All other interests or
encumbrances attaching to the improved realty after the effective
date of a lien granted under this Article shall be subordinate to the
lien, except that the lien shall be subordinate to any purchase money
security interest in the premises if such security instruments and deed
of conveyance are executed, delivered, and recorded as part of the
same transaction. Nothing herein shall be construed to invalidate a
lender's express, recorded subordination of his purchase money se-
curity interest in favor of another encumbrance. l ° °
Should the legislature fail to amend the materialman's lien statute, the
North Carolina appellate courts should construe the existing statutes to ad-
vance the materialman's remedy.' 0 ' The materialman's lien should attach to
an overeager purchaser's interest in the improved property at the moment his
interest is acquired,' 0 2 and should relate back to the first visible commence-
ment of work 0 3 for the purpose of determining its rank among other liens.
The doctrine of instantaneous seisin should not be extended to subordinate
previously accruing materialmen's liens to construction deeds of trust recorded
together with an overeager purchaser's deed.' 4
JULIANNE CT. DOUGLASS
99. Author's proposed amendment to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-7(3) (1976).
100. Author's proposed amendment to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-10 (1976).
101. See supra note 12.
102. See supra notes 38-41 & 63 and accompanying text.
103. See Frank H. Conner Co. v. Spanish Inns Charlotte, Ltd., 294 N.C. 661, 242 S.E.2d 785
(1978).
104. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
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